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The study’s goals were twofold: (1) to examine how children’s and adolescents’ 
guilt-proneness relates to the intensity and nature of their overall distress, and changes in 
their distress, when they narrate experiences of hurting others; and (2) to identify how 
these relations vary under distinct fault conditions and across childhood and adolescence. 
Participants were 116 participants, evenly divided into three age groups (ages 5, 9, and 
16) and by sex. Results suggest that when more guilt-prone youth narrate harmdoing 
experiences, they feel more current overall distress than less guilt-prone youth, but not 
more past distress. Contrary to expectations, these relations do not vary between youths’ 
narration of “it was my fault” and “it was not my fault” harmdoing experiences, and do 
not vary for younger and older youth. Additional analyses show that more and less guilt-
prone youth have different patterns of change in their current distress over the course of 
their narratives about harmdoings, and these changes vary by fault condition. More guilt-
prone children’s distress is temporally stable during their narration of my-fault harm, and 
their distress changes in ways that are unlikely to last when they narrate not-my-fault 
harm, whereas less guilt-prone children’s distress decreases steadily over the course of 
their storytelling under both conditions. Since current and unchanging feelings of distress 
may interfere with narrative processes whereby children learn from harmdoings, this 
study’s findings suggest that more guilt-prone youth of all ages may construct 
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Children’s moral development unfolds through multiple processes, including 
when they construct narrative accounts of their morally laden experiences. One way that 
people make sense of important experiences in their lives is by forming stories about 
them. The particular stories people form shape their future development (McLean, 
Pasupathi, & Pals, 2007). As applied to the moral domain, children create narratives 
about morally laden events, such as times they hurt others. Through the act of narrating 
these experiences, they construct understandings about themselves, others, and the moral 
world. These understandings, in turn, influence their moral development moving forward 
(Pasupathi, Wainryb, Bourne, & Posada, 2017). These processes—how selves create 
stories and how stories create future selves—likely unfold differently when youth are 
more versus less distressed during their storytelling. Theory and evidence suggest that 
children who feel intensely distressed when they narrate negative events construct stories 
that are self-focused and unresolved, have lower prospective well-being, and are less 
likely to consider broad implications of their experiences that are adaptive for their future 
development (e.g., Fivush, Marin, Crawford, Reynolds, & Brewin, 2007; Kross, 
Duckworth, Ayduk, Tsukayama, & Mischel, 2011; Wainryb & Recchia, 2014). As such, 
feeling intense and immersive forms of distress during their narration of harmdoings may 
have detrimental effects on how children feel about themselves, others, and the socio-




less distressed when they narrate harmdoing experiences would contribute to our 
understanding of their moral development. 
Although a variety of dispositional characteristics may lead children and 
adolescents to be more versus less distressed during their narration of harmdoings, in this 
dissertation, I explore the role that their guilt-proneness plays. More guilt-prone children 
have a propensity to feel guilty across a variety of experiences, particularly those 
involving harm of others (Tangney & Tracy, 2012), and this might extend to when they 
narrate harmdoings (Leith & Baumeister, 1998). However, not all harmdoings are 
thought about in the same way. The relations between children’s guilt-proneness and 
their distress during narration may be more or less pronounced depending on how 
children think about their fault, and depending on the age of the child narrating. Lastly, 
people’s distress changes over the course of telling narratives. The best pattern of change 
in distress—in terms increasing the likelihood that narratives will contain growth-
promoting meanings and lead to higher well-being moving forward—is likely steady 
declines in distress during narration. Distress may change over the course of narration 
differently for more and less guilt-prone youth. These youth may also experience 
different forms of distress, such as distressing feelings that are more intense, immediate, 
and intrusive versus those that are felt with some distance and as an object of reflection 
(Kross et al., 2011). This dissertation addressed these issues by examining how children’s 
and adolescents’ guilt-proneness relates to their distress when they narrate harmdoing 






Why is it important to understand which kinds of children  
are more distressed when they narrate harmdoings? 
During experiences when children cause harm to others, it may be understandable 
for them to feel at least some distress. Children’s empathy and concern for the victim’s 
distress may evoke their own feelings of guilt, shame, remorse, or distress (Hoffman, 
2000). However, when they feel intense distress during their narration of past 
harmdoings, it is likely less adaptive. In general, people’s distress is lower when they 
narrate negative experiences than during the original experiences (Pasupathi, 2003). Such 
decreases in distress are theorized to help children  reflect on and construct meanings of 
their interpersonal conflicts. However, children vary in how dramatically their distress 
decreases, and not all distress is the same. Distress that is felt with a sense of distance is 
theorized to be more adaptive than distress that is felt as “hot” and immersive (Kross et 
al., 2011). Research and theory suggest that feeling intense, current distress during 
narration of harmdoings may be problematic in a few ways.  
Children with intense and immediate feelings of distress during their narration of 
harmdoings may narrate these experiences in maladaptive ways, have low well-being, 
and feel badly when they are reminded of the experiences. First, being distressed during 
the narration of harmdoings may lead children to elaborate in their narratives on their 
own perspective rather than to the victim’s perspective and suffering (Eisenberg, Spinrad, 
& Morris, 2013). Narrators who are distressed may also struggle to form productive 
resolutions because events feel ongoing as long as the emotions associated with those 
events are being relived. Children may also wrestle against their intense feelings of 




their developing sense of moral agency. For instance, they may turn themselves into the 
victims even though it was their actions that hurt others (Wainryb & Recchia, 2014). 
Along with forming problematic meanings in their narratives, children who feel intensely 
distressed during their narration of negative events may, over time, develop social and 
emotional difficulties. For example, one study demonstrated that children who focused on 
negative evaluations, problems, and explanations in their narrative accounts—features 
likely associated with feeling more intense distress during narration—had more anxiety, 
depression, and difficulties 2 months later than children who did not have such a negative 
focus during narration (Fivush et al., 2007). As long as harmdoing experiences are 
emotionally unresolved, every time a child is reminded of these experiences—perhaps by 
seeing the peer they hurt—their distressing feelings might arise again. And lastly, a 
possible sequela of feeling intense distress during narration is children choosing to not 
narrate other similar experiences to avoid the discomfort of distressing feelings. People 
sometimes choose to keep experiences secret when they feel guilty or ashamed (Rimé, 
Finkenauer, Luminet, Zech, & Philippot, 1998). Given that the act of narrating 
experiences provides opportunities for children to change how they think and feel about 
experiences—particularly when experiences are narrated to skilled listeners—avoiding 
talking about harmdoings could also be detrimental to children’s future development. 
Because intense distress during narration of harmdoing experiences is detrimental for a 
variety of reasons, this study’s goal is to document which factors relate to children 






What is distress and how is it manifested during narration? 
Distress is an “umbrella term to refer to unpleasant, upsetting, or negative moods 
or emotions” (Baumeister, Zell, & Tice, 2007, p. 422). Since it is a subjective experience 
and emotions involve multiple, loosely coupled components (Mauss, Levenson, McCarter, 
& Wilhelm, 2005; Scherer, 2009), distress can be manifested in a variety of ways. 
Distress is often evident in what people say (verbal indicators), and how they say it 
(nonverbal vocal indicators). How distress is manifested sheds light on the nature of the 
distress being felt. Distress varies in its intensity, its form, and in how it changes over 
time. Two forms of distress are distress that is felt with some distance versus distress that 
is currently felt. Kross and colleagues (2011) have related these forms to the type of 
perspective that people use to analyze their past negative feelings. People can “self-
immerse” when they recall their past distress, which gives rise to reliving those feelings 
in an immediate way—from a close, “insider” perspective. Alternatively, people can 
assume a “self-distanced” perspective, reflecting on past distress from a more objective, 
“outsider” position. Distress is likely to be most problematic during narration when it is 
intense, is currently felt, and lasts over the course of the entire storytelling.  
Previous studies in the moral development literature have examined the contents 
of children’s narratives of their harm doings, and these studies show that children 
sometimes explicitly reference their own negative feelings (e.g., Wainryb, Brehl, & 
Matwin, 2005; Wainryb, Komolova, & Brehl, 2014). For instance, in Wainryb and 
Recchia (2012), an adolescent participant said, “I felt so bad…I remember she started 
crying, and that’s when I felt really bad” (p. 19). Presumably, when people felt or feel 




frequently in their narratives. References can also shed light on the nature of the distress 
being felt. In some narratives, children say that they are still feeling bad—not just felt bad 
in the past. This suggests that they are feeling current distress that is “hot” and immersive, 
and may involve emotion-related physiological arousal.  
Another indicator that narrators may be currently feeling distressed is their vocal 
pitch. Researchers interested in family conflict have examined changes in children’s and 
adolescents’ vocal pitch (e.g., Baucom et al., 2012), but narrative and moral development 
researchers have not yet examined nonverbal vocalizations to assess the extent to which 
narrators are feeling emotionally aroused during narration. When people are emotionally 
aroused, the pitch of their voices gets higher. Distress manifested through vocal pitch is 
presently felt by the speaker and consists of changes in psychological and subjective 
components (Scherer, 1986). An additional benefit to using vocal pitch to measure a 
narrator’s distress is that it can reveal temporal changes in emotional arousal, such as 
how a child’s distress changes over the course of telling a narrative. The present study 
examined how the intensity and form of children’s distress during narration varies 
depending on a dispositional characteristic (guilt-proneness), the presumed meanings and 
judgments that they form in their narratives (fault condition), and developmental changes 
(age differences among 5-, 9-, and 16-year olds). 
 
 
Why might more and less guilt-prone children feel different  
when they narrate harmdoings? 
One characteristic that is likely to play an important role in children’s distress 




proneness has close ties to the concept of guilt, but there are key differences. Guilt-
proneness is a between-person dispositional trait. It is regarded as a part of people’s 
personalities. People who are more guilt-prone have a lower threshold for feeling guilty 
(Torstveit, Sutterlin, & Lugo, 2016), which means that they feel guilty based on fewer or 
more obscure cues. They tend to feel guilty across time and situations, including 
situations when feelings of guilt may be unwarranted (Tilghman-Osborne, Cole, & Felton, 
2012). Guilty feelings arise when someone thinks or feels directly or indirectly 
responsible for another person’s negative state (Estrada-Hollenbeck & Heatherton, 1997; 
Zahn-Waxler, Kochanska, Krupnick, & McKnew, 1990). At any one point in time, guilty 
feelings may or may not stem from a person’s guilt-proneness. That is, a variety of 
factors lead to feelings of guilt. For instance, in some experiences, almost all people feel 
guilty, and in other situations, almost nobody feels guilty. The same is true for distress. 
Surprisingly, no prior studies have examined how children’s guilt-proneness 
relates to their distress during their narration of morally laden experiences. There is one 
study, however, that suggests people’s guilt-proneness can influence how they feel when 
they narrate interpersonal conflicts. Leith and Baumeister (1998) found that adults who 
were more guilt-prone wrote narratives in which they considered the perspective of their 
conflict partner more often than adults who were less guilt-prone, and this was, in turn, 
related to expressing more guilt-relevant thoughts and feelings in the narrative. Inasmuch 
as these findings can be extended to children, they suggest that more and less guilt-prone 
children will be differently distressed when they narrate their harmdoings. For more 
guilt-prone youth, narrating their harmdoing experiences may evoke distress that is more 




Under which conditions are these differences the most pronounced? 
 
More and less guilt-prone children may have distress that is very dissimilar when 
they narrate harmdoings under some conditions, whereas they may have distress that is 
only a little different when they narrate harmdoings under other conditions. One 
condition when their distress may be very dissimilar is when children narrate harmdoing 
experiences when they thought the harm was not their fault. Children who are more guilt-
prone tend to interpret events in ways that lead to guilty feelings, even in conditions when 
guilty feelings seem out of place (Tilghman-Osborne et al., 2012). Guilty feelings are 
unexpected during the narration of not-my-fault experiences, given the types of meanings 
that children arrive at in these narratives. When children narrate not-my-fault harm 
experiences, they often mention that others got hurt because of misunderstandings or 
because they pursued a goal that they thought was legitimate, such as only inviting close 
friends to a celebration (Bourne, Wainryb, & Pasupathi, 2017). It makes sense that these 
sorts of meanings would be associated with mitigated feelings of guilt and distress. But 
that might not be the case for highly guilt-prone youth. When more guilt-prone children 
narrate not-my-fault harm experiences, they may fixate on the negative consequences of 
their actions and feel distressed despite features that could be used to mitigate distress.  
At the same time, the narration of experiences when they thought the harm was 
their fault may be precisely the sort of context when even children with a lower guilt-
proneness have guilt-relevant emotions and thoughts that lead to distressing feelings. 
Children who have a lower guilt-proneness are still capable of having guilt-relevant 
thoughts and feelings; they just do so less often than children who have a higher guilt-




distress during narration likely stems from other factors. These include the meanings that 
they make of their experiences, situational features, and other dispositional characteristics. 
When youth narrate my-fault harm experiences, they often mention that they could or 
should have acted differently, that the harm was caused because they were being careless 
or inattentive, and that they had a causal role in the harm (Bourne et al., 2017). Such 
meanings suggest that children who are less guilt-prone feel at least somewhat distressed 
when they narrate my-fault harm experiences.  
 
 
At what point in childhood are these differences the 
 most pronounced? 
There is evidence suggesting that people’s guilt-proneness is stable across the 
lifespan, and other evidence suggesting that the stability of dispositional characteristics 
similar to guilt-proneness increases with age. The only long-term longitudinal study of 
the stability of youths’ guilt-proneness found that from ages 10 to 18 individuals’ level of 
guilt-proneness is somewhat stable, with correlations around .30 or higher (Tangney & 
Dearing, 2002). In a recent short-term longitudinal study with 400 fifth and sixth graders, 
children’s guilt-proneness was significantly correlated (r = .58) with their guilt-proneness 
6 months later (Roos, Hodges, & Salmivalli, 2014). Although there is some stability in 
guilt-proneness across the school years, other evidence suggests that dispositional 
characteristics like guilt-proneness tend to become increasingly stable, trait-like, and 
predictive with age (Shiner & Caspi, 2012). For instance, the stability of negative 
emotionality increases between toddlerhood and the middle childhood years (Neppl et al., 




have more robust correlations with children’s functioning, such as their distress during 
narration, in adolescence than in early childhood. 
 
 
Does distress change differently over the course of narration for  
children who are more and less guilt-prone? 
Distress during narration can be thought about as a global phenomenon across the 
narrative as a whole. Now I turn to consider the ways in which children’s distress 
changes over the course of constructing narratives about harm—from a story’s beginning 
to its end—and how that varies for youth who are more and less guilt-prone. Children 
who are more guilt-prone may ruminate over distressing features throughout their 
narratives, and struggle to draw the sorts of meanings that are associated with decreasing 
distress at the close of their narratives. By contrast, children who are less guilt-prone may 
feel some distress when they talk about causing harm, but are able to contain, 
contextualize, or get some distance from their own distress by the end of their narratives. 
Fleeting feeling of distress during narration of harmdoings may be less problematic than 
when distress is maintained over the course of the entire story. Near the end of their 
stories, narrators can consider the broader implications of the experience and speculate 
about how they might behave differently in future similar experiences. When narrators 
are still distressed in the latter part of their stories, they may be less likely to consider 








Overview of present research and hypotheses 
The present study explored how more and less guilt-prone children feel when they 
narrate their own experiences of hurting their peers, how these relations (between 
children’s guilt-proneness and distress) are moderated by fault condition, and how they 
are moderated by age group. Various intensities and manifestations of distress were 
considered, including temporal changes in distress over the course of narration. To 
address these aims, 5-, 9-, and 16-year-old children completed a guilt-proneness 
questionnaire (i.e., youth versions of the TOSCA; Tracy & Dearing, 2002). They 
provided verbal narratives of their own experiences of causing harm when they thought it 
was their fault (my-fault harm) and was not their fault (not-my-fault harm). Verbal and 
vocal indicators of the narrator’s distress were extracted from transcripts of the narratives 
and from audio recordings of children narrating.  
Evidence and theory suggested the following hypotheses. First, I expected that 
youth who were more guilt-prone would feel more intense and immersive forms of 
distress than youth who were less guilt-prone as they told stories about their harmdoings 
(Hypothesis 1). Second, I hypothesized that these relations would be the most apparent 
when children narrated experiences when they judged it was not their fault, as compared 
to when they judged it was their fault. In other words, fault condition would moderate 
relations between children’s guilt-proneness and their distress (Hypothesis 2). I also 
expected that age group would moderate the relations. Specifically, I expected that 
relations between guilt-proneness and distress during narration would get stronger with 
age (Hypothesis 3). The first three hypotheses were for overall distress during narration. 




narration differently for more and less guilt-prone youth. I expected that children who 
were less guilt-prone would have distress that decreases more steeply than children who 
were more guilt-prone (Hypothesis 4). Lastly, since distress was measured in a variety of 
ways, it was possible that relations between children’s guilt-proneness and their distress 
would emerge for some distress indices but not for others. I thought that relations would 
be most pronounced for indicators that captured distress that is currently felt and 











 Participants were children and adolescents in three age groups, split evenly by sex. 
The initial sample was 120 youth, but two 5-year-old participants encountered problems 
with the computer tablet, and two other participants (aged 5 and 9) could not think of two 
harm experiences. These four participants were excluded, leading to a final sample of 116 
participants: thirty-seven 5-year-olds (M age = 5.65, SD = .31), thirty-nine 9-year-olds (M 
age = 9.53, SD = .33), and forty 16-year-olds (M age = 16.16, SD = .66). Participants 
were primarily European American (72%), with the remaining children representing a 
variety of ethnicities: African American (3%), Asian (2%), Hispanic and/or Latino/a 
(6%), and mixed descent or other (10%). Seven percent of parents chose to not disclose 





Children were interviewed individually at their schools, community centers, or 
homes. First, they were asked to narrate two experiences of causing harm: a my-fault 
harm event (“A time when you did or said something, and another kid ended up upset or 
hurt, and it was your fault”) and a not-my-fault harm event (“…it was not your fault”). 




Interviews were audio-recorded using a digital audio-recorder and were transcribed 
verbatim. After narrating both harmdoing experiences, children were asked to narrate a 
time when they felt proud and were asked six follow-up questions about each of the 
narrated events. The pride narrative and follow-up questions took approximately 10 
minutes. These tasks were not used in the present study.  
Next, to assess children’s guilt-proneness, participants completed an age-
appropriate version of the Test of Self-Conscious Affect (TOSCA; described below). The 
order in which participants narrated my-fault and not-my-fault events was not 
significantly related to their guilt-proneness scores (ps > .12, assessed separately for each 
age group). Participants finished the study by completing the Implicit Theories of 
Personality measure (ITP; Bempechat, London, & Dweck, 1991; Dweck, 1999), 
subscales from the Behavioral Assessment Scale for Children - 2nd addition (BASC-2), 
and subscales from the Behavior Rating Inventory of Executive Function–Self-Report 
Version (BRIEF-SR; 9- and 16-year-olds only). Results from the ITP, BASC-2, and 
BRIEF were not examined in the present study. All questionnaires were completed using 
an iPad. The experimenter read aloud the questionnaire directions and individual items to 





Guilt-proneness: Test of Self Conscious Affect (TOSCA) 
 
Participants completed one of the most frequently used measures of guilt-
proneness: the Test of Self-Conscious Affect. The TOSCA-Child (Tangney, Wagner, 




was therefore used with participants in the middle age group. The TOSCA-Adolescent 
(Tangney, Wagner, Gavlas, & Gramzow, 1991) was completed by participants in the 
oldest age group. The TOSCA-C was adapted for use with the 5-year-old participants for 
the present study. Modifications are described below.  
The TOSCA-C and TOSCA-A consist of 15 scenarios (10 negative, 5 positive). 
Each scenario is followed by four or five responses designed to assess guilt-proneness, 
shame-proneness, externalization, detachment, alpha pride, and beta pride. Only the 15 
guilt-proneness subscale items were used in this study. Scenarios depict failures and 
successes having to do with social situations and achievement concerns (e.g., grades, 
effort). After each scenario, participants respond to what extent they would endorse a 
guilt-proneness response (1 = not at all likely, 5 = very likely). Guilt-proneness responses 
include feelings of regret or remorse, attempts to repair the harm or apologize, negatively 
evaluating specific behaviors, planning to modify negative behaviors moving forward, 
accepting responsibility, and deserving punishment. The TOSCA-C includes an 
illustration with each scenario. 
Adaptation of the TOSCA-C for 5-year-old participants. Five of the negative 
TOSCA-C scenarios (with their accompanying illustrations) were adapted for use with 
participants in the youngest age group. The five scenarios selected depicted spilling a 
drink (two scenarios), arguing with a friend, talking in class, and inviting a friend to play 
before asking a parent. Scenarios and responses were modified to be in the third-person 
and to include an explicit “Would you feel like that [think that]?” (e.g., “Max and his best 
friend get into an argument at school…He feels sorry and like he shouldn’t have done it. 




the youngest age group had three answer choices that were accompanied by pictures: a 
thumbs up representing “Yes, I would think or feel that way” (coded as 3); a flat hand 
with the palm down representing “Maybe, in the middle. I might think or feel that way 
[I’m not sure]” (coded as 2); and a thumbs down representing “No, I would not think or 
feel that way” (coded as 1). Before completing the TOSCA-C the 5-year-olds participants 
were trained on how to use the iPad and how to select the image that reflected their 
answer.  
TOSCA reliability and data reduction. Previous studies show that the guilt 
subscales of the TOSCA-C and TOSCA-A have acceptable internal consistency, 
convergent and discriminant validity, and test-retest reliability (Roos et al., 2014; Watson, 
Gomez, & Gullone, 2015, 2016). In this study, reliability for the guilt-proneness subscale 
was acceptable for 9- and 16-year-olds (αs = .80 and .67, respectively). Internal reliability 
with the five items was poor for 5-year-olds (α = .34). To gain a sense of whether the 
poor reliability for the 5-year-olds stemmed from them not understanding the adapted 
TOSCA-C, I examined the reliability of the shame-proneness items, which were based on 
the same scenarios as the guilt-proneness items. Reliability for the five shame-proneness 
items was acceptable for 5-year-olds (α = .71) and twice the internal reliability for the 
five guilt-proneness items. Thus, it is unlikely poor reliability was caused by 5-year-olds 
not understanding the adapted TOSCA-C.  
Reliability improved with a two-item version of the 5-year-olds’ guilt-proneness 
questionnaire (α = .58). The two-item version consisted of one scenario in which an actor 
tripped and spilled a friend’s drink and one in which friends got into an argument. The 




Scenarios excluded depicted an actor who spilled drink at her aunt’s house, got in trouble 
for talking in class, and invited a friend over but the actor’s mom said no. I used all 15 
guilt-proneness items for the 9- and 16-year-olds, and the two items for the 5-year-olds. 
Guilt-proneness subscale items were averaged for each participant. Next, since 5-year-
olds used a 3-point Likert-type scale and 9- and 16-year-olds used a 5-point Likert-type 
scale, responses were standardized within each age group. To standardize, the guilt-
proneness mean for a participant’s age group was subtracted from his or her guilt-
proneness score, and then divided by the standard deviation for that age group.  
Children’s guilt-proneness is often positively related to their shame-proneness.1 
Therefore, some researchers decide to examine the effects children’s proneness to 
“shame-free guilt” by removing the shared variance between children’s guilt- and shame-
proneness (e.g., Muris, Meesters, Bouwman, & Notermans, 2015). Other researchers 
study children’s guilt-proneness without controlling for their shame-proneness. 
Researchers who prefer this second approach make a compelling argument that it is 
unclear exactly what is being removed when the common variance between guilt- and 
shame-proneness is removed (Ferguson, Stegge, Eyre, Vollmer, & Ashbaker 2000). For 
this reason, and because my focus is not on the difference between children’s guilt- and 
shame-proneness, I examined the relations between children’s guilt-proneness and their 
distress during narration of harmdoings without controlling for their shame-proneness.  
 
 
                                                
1 In this study, children’s guilt-proneness and shame-proneness were weakly to 
moderately related, r = .14, r = .36, and r = .23, for 5-, 9-, and 16-year-olds, respectively. 





Measures of distress 
Six indices of the distress that children expressed during their narration of 
harmdoings were examined. Three indices were coded from the typed transcripts: 
frequency of references to negative emotions, presence of negative emotions in the 
present-tense, and contour of change in distress. Two indices were assessed from the 
audio of the narratives: aggregate fundamental frequency (f0) range, and f0 range change. 
One index was coded using both typed transcripts and audio: global distress intensity. 
The author coded all narratives, and a research assistant coded 20% of the data to 
establish interrater reliability. For coding schemes that led to a count or ordinal variable, 
interrater reliability was calculated as two-way random intraclass correlation coefficients 
(ICCs) with absolute agreement for a single coder. For coding schemes that led to 
categorical or binary variables, interrater reliability was calculated as Cohen’s kappa (κ). 
These methods are customary in narrative coding (Syed & Nelson, 2015). Reliability 
scores are presented below. 
Number of references to narrator’s own negative emotions. The intensity of 
children’s distress was first operationalized as the frequency of their references to their 
own negative emotions. The typed transcripts of children’s narratives were coded for 
explicit references to the narrator’s negative emotions. Negative emotions include 
specific, discrete negative emotions (anger, sadness, guilt, shame), as well as references 
to nonspecific negative affect (feeling bad). Each phrase in which the narrator references 
his or her negative emotion was coded, and then the number of phrases was summed. 
Repeated references to the same emotion and references to various negative emotions 




narrator’s own negative emotions was high (ICC = .91).  
Narrator’s negative emotions in the present tense. Narratives with any references 
to the narrator’s negative emotions were examined to find whether at least one negative 
emotion was in the present tense (e.g., “I still feel bad about what I did”). Present-tense 
negative emotions suggest that the narrator is still immersed in their current feelings of 
distress. Stories in which the narrator referenced one or more negative emotion in the 
present tense received a code of 1. Stories with no references to negative emotions or 
with only negative emotions in the past tense received a code of 0. Interrater reliability 
for the presence of the narrator’s negative emotions in the present tense was excellent 
(Cohen’s κ = 1.00).  
Coded contour: Change in distress according to verbal indicators. Typed 
transcripts of the narratives were also examined to classify how distress changed from the 
beginning of a story to its end. Each narrative was classified into one of three contour 
patterns: the narrator appears to have low levels of distress that are maintained over the 
course of narration (stable-low contour), the narrator appears to have moderate to high 
levels of distress that are maintained over the course of narration (stable-high contour), or 
the narrator’s distress appears to decrease over the course of narration (decreasing 
contour). Verbal statements that suggested that the narrator was feeling moderate or 
intense distress included references to the narrator’s own negative emotions (see above), 
negative evaluations of their own behavior (“I shouldn’t have said that to him”), 
maximizing the harmful outcome for the victim or for the relationship (“She was really, 
really sad; We were never friends again”), and implying that the victim did not deserve to 




narrative were positive resolutions (“It’s all okay now”). Past and currently felt distress 
were both considered. Interrater reliability for the contour of change in distress according 
to verbal indicators was adequate (Cohen’s κ = .86). 
Fundamental frequency range. How emotional children sound in terms of vocal 
pitch during their narration of harmdoings was operationalized as their range of 
fundamental frequency. F0 is measured in cycles per second (hertz, Hz). Methods of 
extracting f0 range in the present study were modeled after procedures used by Baucom et 
al. (2012). To extract f0 range, audio files of each narrative were be prepared by 
separating the participant’s conversational turns from the interviewer’s conversational 
turns. Nonspeech artifacts such as background noises were silenced. Next, the 
participant’s audio file was analyzed in .25-second intervals using Praat (Boersma & 
Weenink, 2016). Praat was specified to produce the f0 mean, minimum, and maximum 
for each .25 second of the child’s speech turns, with an appropriate bandpass filter 
restricting values of f0 to be within an appropriate range for child speech (Owren & 
Bachorowski, 2007; Sorenson, 1989). Errors in pitch extraction were corrected using 
standard procedures (Baucom et al., 2012; Johnstone, van Reekum, Hird, Kirsner, & 
Scherer, 2005).  Next, the f0 maximum and minimum values were averaged into 5-second 
intervals within each narrative. F0 was only calculated for 5-second blocks when there 
were at least 3 quarter-seconds of speech within that block. Data were marked as missing 
for blocks when the participants’ vocalizations were less than 3 quarter-seconds, it was 
silent or nonspeech artifacts were present for the entire 5 seconds, and only the 





Aggregate f0 range. First, in order to calculate an aggregate f0 range score for each 
narrative, I subtracted the minimum f0 value, out of all the blocks in the entire narrative 
(i.e., the minimum of all the minimum f0 values, after they have been averaged into 5-
second blocks), from the maximum f0 value, out of all the blocks in the entire narrative 
(the maximum of all the maximum f0 values, after they have been averaged into 5-second 
blocks). Consistent with prior work (e.g., Juslin & Scherer, 2005) a greater aggregate f0 
range indicates more distress.  
F0 range in 5-second blocks. Second, in order to examine change in f0 range over 
the course of narration, I calculated a second form of f0 range scores using the 5-second 
blocks. The minimum f0 value used to calculate the aggregate f0 range score (i.e., 
minimum minimum) was subtracted from the maximum f0 value for each 5-second block.  
Global distress. The final dependent variable was global distress. Coders listened 
to audio files of children narrating their harm experiences and simultaneously read the 
typed transcripts. Coders rated the extent of the narrator’s distress, with distress defined 
as feeling sad, withdrawn, anxious, tense, fearful, or a nonspecific “bad”. Codes ranged 
from 1 (relaxed) to 4 = (medium to lots of distress). Reliability for global distress coding 




A series of multilevel models were run for analyses, using HLM Version 7.0 
(Raudenbush, Bryk, & Congdon, 2011). Separate models were run for each distress 
indicator. For the first set of analyses, data were nested as narratives (level 1) within 




condition (0 = not-my-fault harm, 1 = my-fault harm) was added to level 1. The 
standardized guilt-proneness predictor was added to level 2, and the cross-level 
interaction between guilt-proneness (level 2) and fault condition (level 1) was specified. 
A dummy-coded set of categorical predictors representing the three age groups were 
added to the models, with 9-year-olds acting as the reference group. Variables 
representing interactions of age group and guilt-proneness were created and included on 
level 2. All distress intensity variables and continuous predictors were analyzed for 
normality. Global distress and fundamental frequency range were normally distributed. 
Because present-tense negative emotions was coded dichotomously, a Bernoulli 
distribution was specified in HLM, and because the number of negative emotions was a 
count variable, a Poisson distribution was specified in HLM. A multinomial model was 
specified in HLM for coded contour of change in distress. 
For the growth analysis, data were nested as follows: time in 5-second blocks 
(level 1), within narratives (level 2), within people (level 3). The outcome was distress 
intensity as indexed by f0 range in 5-second blocks. Time was added as a level 1 predictor, 
with 0 as the first 5 seconds of the narrative. Scatterplots and descriptives of how f0-range 
changes across time were examined to determine which contours of change across time 
were reasonable (e.g., linear, quadratic). Standardized guilt-proneness was added to level 
3, and cross-level interactions were specified between guilt-proneness (level 3) and the 
lower-level predictors of time (level 1) and fault condition (level 2). 
Sex was included as a covariate in analyses predicting f0 range (-.5 = female, .5 = 
male). After puberty there are sex differences in f0 parameters, with males having lower 




covariate (grand-centered) for models predicting number of narrator’s negative emotions 
and presence of present-tense negative emotions. Length of narrative in terms of number 
of 5-second blocks was included as a covariate on level 2 (grand-centered) for the model 










Table 1 presents the means and standard deviations of distress indices by fault 
condition and age group. As discussed in the Method section, guilt-proneness was 
standardized within each age group because 5-year-olds used a 3-point scale and were 
presented only a few scenarios while 9- and 16-year-olds used a 5-point scale and were 
presented with the full 15 scenarios of the TOSCA. Guilt-proneness scores were as 
follows before standardization: M 5-year-olds = 2.64, SD = .59 ; M 9-year-olds = 4.10, SD = .45; 
and M 16-year-olds = 3.83, SD = .41. Table 2 presents correlations between study variables. 
Correlations for my-fault harm narratives are denoted above the diagonal and correlations 
for not-my-fault harm narratives are denoted below the diagonal. As expected, the 
multiple indicators of distress were interrelated, in both my-fault narratives and not-my-
fault narratives. However, correlations tended to be small in magnitude; 9 out of the 12 
zero-order correlations among the distress variables were below .20. According to the 
bivariate correlations between guilt-proneness and distress (shown in Table 2) children’s 
guilt-proneness was not significantly related to any indicators of distress, but there was a 
positive trend (r = .18, p = .052) between guilt-proneness and aggregate f0 range in the 
not-my-fault context.  
Next, I ran six multilevel models: four to examine overall distress indicators (one 
model for each indicator), one model to examine the contour of change over the course of 




contour of change over the course of narration in terms of change in f0 range every 5 
seconds. Results revealed no support for my third hypothesis—that the relation between 
guilt-proneness and distress during narration of harmdoings would be stronger for older 
youth than for younger youth Across all six models, the interactions between guilt-
proneness and the age group variables were not significantly different from zero. (This 
was also the case when the reference group was changed to 5- or 16-year-olds and the 
appropriate interactions entered.). When the guilt-proneness and age group interaction 
variables were removed from the models, there were no effects that changed in 
significance. Therefore, the guilt-proneness x age group interactions were removed from 
the models presented below and Hypothesis 3 was disconfirmed. 
 
 
Guilt-proneness and overall distress intensity  
during narration of harmdoings 
Table 3 presents the results of the four multilevel models used to test hypotheses 1 
and 2. Each indicator of overall distress was regressed onto the main effects of guilt-
proneness, fault condition, and dummy-coded variables for the age groups; the interaction 
between guilt-proneness and condition; and relevant covariates. The following equations 
describe these models: 
Level-1 (Narrative):   Overall Distressij = β0j + β1j*(Fault Condition) + rij 
Level-2 (Individual):  β0j = γ00 + γ01*(GP) + γ02*(Age1) + γ03*(Age2) + covariate + µ0j 
β1j = γ10  + γ11*(GP)  
The model with number of the narrator’s negative emotions as the distress 




and fault condition (see Table 3). I had hypothesized that guilt-proneness would have a 
stronger link to distress in the not-my-fault condition, but results revealed that the link 
between guilt-proneness and negative emotions approached significance in the my-fault 
condition (p = .064), but not in the not-my-fault condition (p = .520). In my-fault harm 
narratives, children who were higher in guilt-proneness made more references to their 
own negative emotions than children who were lower in guilt-proneness. There was a 
significant main effect of fault condition. Unsurprisingly, participants referenced more 
negative emotions in their my-fault harm stories than in their not-my-fault harm stories. 
A significant main effect of age group emerged for the dummy-coded variable 
representing the difference between 5- and 9-year-olds. Consistent with prior research, 5-
year-olds referenced fewer of their own negative emotions than 9-year-olds. Word count 
was included in the model as a covariate, and participants who told longer stories 
referenced more negative emotions (B = .003, p < .001).  
The next model predicted the presence (vs. absence) of narrators’ references to 
their own negative emotions in the present tense. Present-tense negative emotions were 
infrequently referenced under both fault conditions (see Table 1 for the proportion of 
narratives containing these references). One concern in statistical analyses with outcomes 
that seldom arise is that estimates are biased (Atkins & Gallop, 2007). However, this 
model—in which I specified a Bernoulli distribution since the outcome was binary—had 
standard errors of the estimates that were small and reasonable, which suggests that 
estimates were not biased. Results supported the first hypothesis. Children who were 
more guilt-prone were more likely to construct narratives that contained at least one 




more likely to reference a present-tense negative emotion in their my-fault stories than in 
their not-my-fault stories. Word count was also included in this model as a covariate. 
Participants who told longer stories were more likely to reference a present-tense 
negative emotion (B = .004, p = .002). Coefficients and standard errors of the coefficients 
are reported in Table 3.  
 For distress as the aggregate f0 range, there was a trend in the expected direction 
for the main effect of guilt-proneness, with participants who were more guilt-prone 
showing a greater aggregate f0 range during narration than participants who were less 
guilt-prone (p = .081, see Table 3). Sixteen-year-olds had a smaller aggregate f0 range 
than 9-year-olds. Lastly, sex was included in the model as a covariate. Consistent with 
prior research (Baucom et al., 2012), boys had a smaller f0 aggregate range than girls (B 
= -11.35, p = .011). 
As shown in Table 3, in the final model of overall distress I regressed global 
distress on guilt-proneness and the other predictors. The main effect of guilt-proneness 
and a guilt-proneness x fault condition effect were not significantly different from zero. 
Both 5- and 16-year-olds had lower global distress than 9-year-olds. Not surprisingly, 
participants had higher levels of global distress in their my-fault narratives than in their 
not-my-fault narratives.  
 
 
Guilt-proneness and change in distress 
over the course of narration 
In the next set of analyses, I examined whether higher levels of guilt-proneness 




(Hypothesis 4). First, a two-level model was conducted to test the coded contour of 
change in distress. I specified a multinomial model with the three coded contours: low 
flat, high flat, decreasing. In analyses, category 1 was specified as the high-flat distress 
contour and category 2 was specified as the decreasing distress contour. Hypothesis 4 
was not supported by the model; effects of guilt-proneness and guilt-proneness x fault 
condition did not emerge as significant. However, for both the high-flat and decreasing 
contours, there were main effects of fault condition. Participants were more likely to 
construct narratives with high-flat and decreasing contours in the my-fault condition than 
in the not-my-fault condition (for high-flat, B = 1.55, p < .01; for decreasing, B = 1.83, p 
< .01). There were no main effects of age group. 
Next, I examined changes in distress as measured by fundamental frequency (f0) 
range in 5-second blocks over the course of narration. First, I examined Lowess 
smoothed plots of f0 range. Plots suggested that a linear and quadratic growth model was 
a reasonable approach for data analysis. A plot for a 10-year-old boy (not-my-fault harm 
narrative) and a 15-year-old girl (my-fault harm narrative) are displayed in Figure 1. F0 
range was regressed onto the main effects and interactions for guilt-proneness, fault 
condition, and age group, with sex and number of total blocks as covariates. This model 
also included time in 5-second blocks (linear term), quadratic time, and—to assess the 
primary prediction—interactions between the time variables and guilt-proneness. This 
equation describes the growth model:  
Level-1 (Time): Y(F0 Range)ijk = π0jk + π1jk*(Linear Time) + π2jk*(Quadratic Time) + eijk 
Level-2 (Narrative):  π0jk = β00k + β01k*(Fault Condition) + β02k*(Num. of Blocks) + r0jk 




π2jk = β20k + β21k*(Fault Condition) 
Level-3 (Individuals): β00k = γ000+ γ001*(GP)+ γ002*(Age1)+ γ003*(Age2)+ γ004*(Sex)+u00k 
β01k = γ010 + γ010*(GP)  
β02k = γ020  
β10k = γ100 + γ101*(GP) 
β11k = γ110 + γ111*(GP) 
β20k = γ200 + γ201*(GP) 
β21k = γ210 + γ211*(GP) 
As depicted in Table 4 at the start of narration (i.e., the intercept) 16-year-olds 
had a smaller f0 range than 9-year-olds. Covariates revealed that males had a smaller f0 
range at the start of narration than females, and a greater f0 range at the start of narration 
was related to telling a longer narrative overall. Children’s guilt-proneness was not 
related to the intensity of their distress at the start of their narratives. I hypothesized that 
children’s guilt-proneness would moderate how distress changed over the course of 
telling a narrative, with higher levels of guilt-proneness relating to less steep declines in 
distress. Analyses revealed that main effects of linear and quadratic time were qualified 
by interactions, and all significant interactions involved fault condition. To aid with the 
interpretation of the 3-way interactions, I used Preacher’s online tools to calculate simple 
slopes for youth who had a lower guilt-proneness (mean - 1 SD) and those who had a 
higher guilt-proneness (mean + 1 SD), during narration of not-my-fault and my-fault 






Linear change in f0 range over the course of narration  
As shown in Table 4, there was on average a decline in children’s distress across 
narration. For every 5 seconds that progressed during narration, children’s f0 range 
became smaller by .36 units. Next, the ways in which children’s guilt-proneness was 
associated with linear changes in distress varied by fault condition (see Figure 2). Simple 
slopes reveal that for youth with a high guilt-proneness, distress significantly decreased 
over the course of narrating not-my-fault harm experiences (B = -0.57, p < .0001), but did 
not decrease when they narrated my-fault harm experiences (B = .01, p > .05). For low 
guilt-prone youth, distress decreased during narration of my-fault harm (B = -.23, p 
= .058) and not-my-fault harm (B = -.15, p > .05) stories, with decreases that did not 
quite reach significance.  
 
Quadratic change in f0 range over the course of narration 
On average, decreases in distress slowed down, plateaued, or reversed as 
children’s narratives progressed (a positive, U-shaped contour), with contours of change 
fitting this quadratic pattern more often during the telling of not-my-fault harm narratives 
than during the telling of my-fault harm ones. Guilt proneness was also associated with 
distress changing in a quadratic fashion, but in a way that varied by fault condition (see 
Table 4). Simple slope clarified the quadratic time x guilt-proneness x fault condition 
interaction. Children with a high proneness to guilt had decreases in distress that began to 
plateau over the course of narrating their not-my-fault stories (B = .007, p < .05), whereas 
when these same youth narrated my-fault stories, changes in distress did not assume a 




quadratic changes were nonsignificant during both narration of not-my-fault (B = -.001, p 
> .05) and my-fault (B = .001, p > .05) stories. 
These findings show some support for my fourth hypothesis, which was that for 
youth with a higher guilt-proneness, declines in distress would be less steep than the 
declines for youth with a lower guilt-proneness. Results revealed that these relations were 
more complex than I expected. For youth with a low proneness to guilt, distress 
decreased while they narrated harmdoings under both conditions, and these decreases 
continued over the course of narration. That is, their decreasing distress did not level-off 
or show quadratic rebounds. For youth with a high proneness to guilt, distress 
significantly decreased while they narrated not-my-fault narratives, but these decreases 
started to level-off at some point during narration. For youth with a high proneness to 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Correlations of Guilt-Proneness and Overall Indicators of Distress 
 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Guilt-proneness -- .16 .14 .03 .11 
2. Number of negative emotions -.02 -- .53*** .15 .27** 
3. Present-tense neg. emotion  .10 .11 -- .07 .19* 
4. Aggregate f0 range  .18 -.01 .08 -- .07 
5. Global distress .10 .21* .15 .13 -- 
 
Notes. Correlations for my-fault narratives are denoted above the diagonal and 
correlations for not-my-fault narratives are denoted below the diagonal. Present-tense neg. 
emotion = bivariate coding of present-tense negative emotion words. f0 = fundamental 
frequency.  



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Multilevel Modeling of the Effects of Guilt Proneness, Age, and Fault Condition on 
Change in Distress Intensity Over the Course of Narration; Final Model With Robust 
Standard Errors 
 
Variable Coefficient (SE) t(df), p 
Intercept (Distress at start of narration)   
 Intercept (9-year-olds; not-my-fault) 98.36 (3.37) t(111) = 29.14, p < .001 
 Guilt-proneness  3.00 (2.97) t(111) = 1.01, p = ns 
 5-year-olds vs. 9-year-olds -1.00 (4.58) t(111) = -.22, p = ns 
 16-year-olds vs. 9-year-olds -24.83 (4.47) t(111) = -5.56, p < .001 
 Sex -11.46 (4.02) t(111) = -2.85, p < .01 
 Fault condition  -.86 (2.64) t(113) = -.33, p = ns 
 Guilt-proneness x Fault condition -4.00 (2.64) t(113) = -1.52, p = ns 
 Number of 5-second blocks .25 (.07) t(113) = 3.52, p < .001 
Linear Change in Distress   
 Intercept -.36 (.08) t(5001) = -4.32, p < .001 
 Guilt-proneness  -.21 (.11) t(5001) = -1.83, p = ns 
 Fault condition .26 (.14) t(5001) = 1.84, p = ns 
 Guilt-proneness x Fault condition .33 (.15) t(5001) = 2.22, p < .05 
Quadratic Change in Distress 
  
 Intercept .003 (.00) t(5001) = 2.97, p < .01 
 Guilt-proneness  .004 (.00) t(5001) = 1.66, p = ns 
 Fault condition -.003 (.00) t(5001) = -2.33, p < .05 
 Guilt-proneness x Fault condition -.005 (.00) t(5001) = -2.10, p < .05 
    
 
Notes. ns = not significantly different from zero at p < .05. Not-my-fault condition was 




























Time (in 5-second blocks) 
 
Figure 1. Lowess-smoothed plots of f0 range over the course of narration, for two 
examples: a 10-year-old boy narrating a not-my-fault account (left panel) and a 15-year-


















Figure 2. Guilt-proneness and linear declines in distress over the course of narration, for 


























(1) High guilt-proneness, Fault account 
(2) High guilt-proneness, No-Fault account 
(3) Low guilt-proneness, Fault account 











In this dissertation, I examined differences in more and less guilt-prone children’s 
distress when they narrate experiences of harm doing. Narrating harmdoing experiences 
can promote children’s moral development. Children reflect on, and grapple with, various 
facets of their experiences and construct understandings about themselves, others, and the 
moral world in general during narration (Pasupathi et al., 2017; Wainryb et al., 2005). 
However, these processes could be disrupted when children feel intensely distressed 
during narration. Theory and research suggest that the intensity of children’s distress, its 
form, and changes in their distress could relate to the types of meanings that they 
consider during narration, their prospective well-being, and their susceptibility to feel 
distressed when they are later reminded of the event (Fivush et al., 2007; Kross et al., 
2011; Wainryb & Recchia, 2012). As such, it is important to understand which factors 
relate to children feeling more versus less distressed when they narrate harmdoings.  
The main factor I examined in this study was children’s proneness to guilt. Two 
key findings were revealed: (1) more guilt-prone children feel more current distress than 
less guilt-prone children when they narrate harmdoings, but not more past distress; and 
(2) over the course their storytelling more guilt-prone children’s distress is less likely to 
change in lasting ways than less guilt-prone children’s distress, and this is particularly 





Guilt-prone children may feel more current overall distress than  
less guilt-prone children when they narrate harmdoings,  
but not more past overall distress 
This study’s findings suggest that narration of past harmdoings may evoke more 
intense, current distress, but not past distress, for youth who are more guilt-prone than for 
youth who are less so. Distress has distinct aspects. Sometimes it is felt intensely and in 
the current moment. Alternatively, distress can be felt with a sense of distance in more 
moderate or weak intensities. Analyses revealed some support that more guilt-prone 
children feel more overall current distress than less guilt-prone children when they 
narrate their harmdoings; there was a trend for them to have greater aggregate f0 range, 
and they were significantly more likely to reference their own negative emotions using 
present-tense language. These two indices of distress are well-suited to capture distress 
that is presently being felt. Fundamental frequency (f0) is influenced by emotion-related 
physiological changes (Scherer, 1986). And of course when narrators say they “feel bad” 
they likely are distressed. Consider the following narrative, from a 15-year-old girl whose 
guilt-proneness was high—1.08 standard deviation above the mean for her age group. 
Her reference to a present-tense negative emotion in her my-fault narrative is italicized:   
I think it was fifth grade. One of my best friends wasn’t being nice…and I hit her 
in the back of her head. I just kind of, like, clocked her. And that was probably 
not a thing I should have done. Like, I still feel bad about it even though I 
apologized a bunch. That’s not like—I don’t hit people, that’s not, like, a thing I 
do. (My-fault harm account) 




relived during the experience of narrating. Recall of past negative experiences is a well-
established paradigm to induce current negative emotions (Kross et al., 2011; Wainryb et 
al., in press). This study suggests narration of harmdoings may differently evoke distress 
for more and less guilt-prone youth. More specifically, children who are more guilt-prone 
may be more susceptible than those who are less guilt-prone to relive their past negative 
feelings once again when they recall and narrate their experiences of hurting others. This 
could be problematic, because children may often be reminded of their past 
experiences—when they interact with the person they hurt or encounter other similar 
experiences.  
Although it is beyond the precise scope of this study, this narrative excerpt also 
raises questions about how distress may lead to (or reflect that) problematic meaning-
making is taking place. For example, in the narrative excerpt above, the participant is still 
feeling distressed, and she is making identity-relevant connections between her harmful 
actions and her more enduring sense of herself as a moral person. She is carrying the 
experience forward with her in lasting ways. An interesting direction for future work 
would be to focus more precisely on the types of meanings that tend to arise when 
narrators feel more and less currently distressed when they narrate harmdoings, as well as 
relations to other developmental sequela (e.g., prospective well-being).  
In contrast with finding that more guilt-prone children are significantly more 
likely than less guilt-prone children to mention a present tense negative emotion, and the 
trend for aggregate fundamental frequency (f0) range in the same direction, analyses of 
the other two indices of overall distress did not reveal significant effects of guilt-




own negative emotions and were not rated as globally more distressed than less guilt-
prone youth. This may be because these two indices of distress did not distinguish 
between current and past distress. Recalling past feelings of distress may be similar for 
more and less guilt-prone youth. Distress at any point in time is influenced by a variety of 
factors (e.g., dispositional, situational, developmental). One possibility is that more and 
less guilt-prone children feel similar types and intensities of distress during their 
harmdoing experiences, and they are equally likely to recall these past feelings of distress 
during their narration of these experiences. Both groups of children may feel elevated 
levels of some current distress while narrating these past negative experiences—since 
narrating negative events usually evokes current negative emotions (Pasupathi, 2003)—
but it appears that only for the more guilt-prone children are these feelings intense and 
immersive. In other words, it may be that for less guilt-prone children, past distress is 
recalled with a sense of distance that prevents it from being entirely relived. Such 
questions could be examined in future research.  
 
 
How about under conditions when these feelings are  
more and less appropriate? 
I had hypothesized that when youth narrated harmdoings when guilty feelings 
seemed unwarranted, more guilt-prone children would be significantly more distressed 
overall than less guilt-prone children. Having a high proneness to guilt entails feeling 
guilty in situations when it might be inappropriate for the circumstances (Tilghman-
Osborne et al., 2012). For this study, I chose a “less appropriate” condition as one when 




Findings revealed no support for the idea that more guilt-prone youth are particularly 
more distressed than less guilt-prone youth when they narrated not-my-fault harm 
experiences.  
Null findings for the interaction between guilt-proneness and fault condition 
might have emerged because in both of the fault conditions, children engaged in actions 
that led to harm of others. It might be that it is only during narration of experiences when 
guilty feelings are even more inappropriate that we find the expected differences in 
distress for more and less guilt-prone youth. Guilty feelings may be particularly 
inappropriate when children tell narratives about times when they were the targets of 
harm (i.e., in the role of the victim) or when they were bystanders when someone else got 
hurt. Guilt-relevant feelings during the narration of these kinds of experiences may be 
particularly out of place and maladaptive.  
My focus was in how fault condition moderated the effects of being more or less 
guilt-prone. While analyses did not reveal these interactions, they did reveal main effects 
of fault condition for 3 out of the 4 overall distress codes. Evidence suggested that when 
children narrate my-fault harm accounts, they are more distressed than when they narrate 
not-my-fault harm accounts. Distress during narration of harmdoings can stem from a 
variety of factors: dispositional, situational, developmental, and meanings made during 
narration. These findings suggest that how children make sense of their fault may play a 
role in how distressed they are during narration of harmdoings. Children’s my-fault and 
not-my-fault harm narratives differ in their content and structure (Bourne et al., 2017). 
Future research should explore how children’s distress during narration of harmdoings is 




What about youth of different ages? 
There was no evidence—not even trends—suggesting that youths’ guilt-proneness 
and their distress during narration of harmdoings varied across the school years. I reran 
analyses without the 5-year-olds to test whether the null effects of the interactions (guilt-
proneness by age group interactions) were due to the poor reliability of the 5-year-olds’ 
guilt-proneness measure. The pattern of results did not change. Thus, null effects were 
unlikely a function poor estimate reliability. Rather, across all ages, more and less guilt-
prone youth show similar overall distress when they narrate harmdoings. In this study, 
the stable nature of differences between more and less guilt-prone children was striking 
given the wide age range of participants (ages 5 to 16). Prior work has demonstrated that 
children’s emotional traits become more stable and predictive with development (Neppl 
et al., 2010; Shiner & Caspi, 2012). Yet, despite this increased stability and various 
developmental changes in children’s understanding of guilt (Muris & Meesters, 2014), 
their emotional regulation (Silvers et al., 2012), and in how they narrate accounts of 
harmdoings (e.g., Wainryb et al., 2005), it appears that children’s guilt-proneness plays a 
similar role in the distress of younger and older youth. Such findings are consistent with 
other research has found no age differences in the correlates of guilt-proneness (e.g., 
Ferguson et al., 2000; Hughes, Gullone, & Watson, 2011; Tangney, Wagner, Hill-Barlow, 
Marschall, & Gramzow, 1996).  
Although it was not the focus of this study, analyses did reveal some main effects 
of age group. During their narration of harmdoings, 9-year-olds were significantly more 
distressed than 5-year-olds according to two of the four overall distress indicators 




significantly more distressed than 16-year-olds according to two of the four indicators 
(aggregate f0 range, global distress). The growth analysis of change in f0 range over time 
also revealed that 9-year-olds were more distressed than 16-year-olds at the start of their 
narratives. Future research should examine the meanings and evaluations that 9-year-olds 
form in their narrative accounts of harmdoings to expand our understanding of why youth 
in middle childhood are particularly distressed during narration. They may be old enough 
to draw self-relevant implications of from harmdoing experiences, but too young to 
successfully regulate the distress that arises from considering they are flawed moral 
beings. There is also some evidence that youth in middle to late childhood are more likely 
than younger and older youth to say that people should suppress their own desires and 
goals when they conflict with their friends’ desires and goals (Komolova & Wainryb, 
2011). When 9-year-olds tell narratives about times when they did prioritize their own 
goals or perspectives over others’, it could therefore be particularly distressing. 
 
 
How does distress change over the course of narration for more  
and less guilt-prone youth? 
Distress during narration can be conceptualized as a global, overall phenomenon 
or as changing over the course of narration. In terms of temporal change, I theorized that 
more guilt-prone children’s distress would remain mostly stable over the course of their 
storytelling, whereas less guilt-prone children would have distress that fell over the 
course of their storytelling. This expectation was based on the idea that resolutions and 
self-insights tend to be considered near the end of narratives, and these sorts of meanings 




for overall distress, there was more support for this hypothesis for analyses of changes in 
current distress (i.e., f0 range) than for changes in distress that did not differentiate 
between current and past distress (i.e., coded contours). For analyses of coded contours, 
children’s guilt-proneness was not significantly related to how their distress changed over 
the course of narration. In addition to the explanation above, differences could be due to 
the coded contours not being fine-grained enough to capture how distress was changing. 
Similarly, none of the contours depicted quadratic change, and changes in f0 range over 
time showed that nonlinear changes over the course of narration occurred for some youth.   
While there were null effects for interactions between children’s guilt-proneness 
and fault condition on their overall distress during narration of harmdoings, there was 
more support for the idea that more and less guilt-prone youth experience current distress 
during narration in temporally distinct ways depending on the fault condition. Results of 
the growth model analysis showed that more and less guilt-prone children had similar 
levels of current distress at the start of their narratives. Less guilt-prone children’s 
distress decreased across narration for both my-fault and not-my-fault stories, with 
significant decreases in the my-fault case. Further, for children with a low guilt-proneness 
there were not significant quadratic rebounds in narratives under either fault condition, 
which suggests that decreases in distress extended through the end of the narrative. These 
findings suggest that for children who are less guilt-prone, narrating harmdoings is not an 
entirely distress-free experience. Rather they start their narratives feeling current distress 
at moderate levels, and, presumably, the process of narration helps them to transform 
their current feelings of distress into something that can be reflected on with some 




need to be acknowledged and expressed, but not lead to rumination, to promote the best 
mental health and physical outcomes (Kross et al., 2011; Smyth & Pennebaker, 2008). 
Feeling less distressed by the end of storytelling may also allow youth to explore a 
variety of facets of their experiences, including the victim’s perspective and broader 
implications and insights. It might also promote their future well-being, and set them up 
for feeling better when they are later reminded of the experience (Fivush et al., 2007).  
Children with a high guilt-proneness also had distress that decreased during their 
narration of not-my-fault events, yet the rate of decreasing distress slowed down over the 
course of narration. This suggests that there may be some moments during narration of 
not-my-fault experiences when youth with a high guilt-proneness feel better, but these 
changes do not last. It is possible that for high guilt-prone youth, there may be a certain 
intensity level that their current distress does not fall below in the context of narrating 
harmdoings. It might not feel “right” to more guilt-prone youth to feel only very little (or 
a complete absence of) distress when they talk about harmdoings, even when they think it 
was not their fault. So when their distress reaches the lower boundary of their comfort or 
familiarity level, it asymptotes. Such findings suggest that in the not-my-fault context, 
children with a high guilt-proneness may form meanings early in their narratives that help 
reduce their distress, but then later in the narratives, these meanings are “undone” or no 
further distress-reducing meanings are considered. For example, more guilt-prone youth 
may describe misunderstandings or the clashing of legitimate goals in the first part of 
their narratives, but then they focus on the negative consequences to the victim at the end 
of their stories. When children with a high guilt-proneness narrated my-fault harm events, 




they narrate my-fault harm, more guilt-prone children struggle to transform their current 
distress into distress that can be objectively analyzed with some distance. This suggests 
that every time more guilt-prone children recall and narrate a specific my-fault 
harmdoing, the distressing feelings that accompany that memory will be of a similar 
nature and similarly intense. The feelings are not changed or resolved. Altogether, the 
study’s findings raise questions about how more guilt-prone children are narrating their 




Which other factors are related to children’s distress at the  
beginning of their narratives? 
One benefit to using growth modeling is that it can reveal how psychological 
phenomena are related to how stories begin and to how they change over time. I set up 
my growth model so the intercept represented the first 5 seconds of narrating. At the start 
of their narratives, 16-year-olds were less distressed than 5- and 9-year-olds (discussed 
above), and males were less distressed than females. F0 range takes into account 
differences in mean pitch changes, which are found for males and females after puberty 
(Hollien, Green, & Massey, 1994). Thus, pubertal changes unlikely explain these sex 
differences. Sex differences were also found for aggregate f0 range. These two findings 
suggest that boys may be less distressed than girls when they narrate their harmdoings. 
This could be due to a number of factors. There is some evidence that girls explore 
emotional facets of their experiences more often than boys in their narratives (Fivush, 




their harmdoings. It is also possible that boys and girls nominated different kinds of 
harmdoing experiences, with girls recalling and selecting experiences that were more 
emotionally laden. I only included sex as a predictor for analyses of f0 range because 
prior research suggested it was necessary to control for sex when examining vocal pitch 
(e.g., Baucom et al., 2012). Examining whether boys and girls have distinct intensities of 
distress when they narrate harmdoings according to other indicators of distress would be 
useful in clarifying sex differences in children’s distress.   
Children who were more distressed at the start of their narratives told longer 
narratives (i.e., narratives that contained more 5-second blocks). A similar finding was 
found for overall distress. Word count was added as a covariate in models predicting the 
number of references narrators made to their own negative emotions, and the presence of 
at least one of their own negative emotions in the present-tense. For both of these 
outcomes, narrators who told longer narratives were also more distressed. This suggests 
that high distress may be felt when narrators are constructing narratives in which they 
ruminate about emotionally laden issues.  
 
 
Limitations and conclusions 
 
There were a number of null results in this study. Null results emerged for 
analyses of distress when it was manifested as blends of current and past negative 
feelings, for all of the guilt-proneness by age group interactions, and for the guilt-
proneness by fault condition interactions predicting overall distress. These results suggest 
that children’s guilt-proneness plays only a minimal role in children’s distress when they 




behave similarly across the school years and under different conditions. The more 
consistent and robust effects of age group and fault condition suggest that developmental 
factors and situationally embedded meanings are more closely linked with children’s 
distress during their narration of these experiences, and are more fruitful directions for 
future research than dispositional characteristics. 
Another limitation of the present study was the low internal consistency of the 5-
year-olds’ guilt-proneness measure. Although reliability improved with a 2-item version 
of the questionnaire, it was still poor. The dearth of significant findings may be linked 
with decreases in statistical power that were due to the poor internal reliability of 5-year-
olds’ guilt-proneness (Heo, Kim, & Faith, 2015). However, this seems unlikely since 
analyses conducted without the 5-year-olds revealed no change in the pattern of results 
(though power decreased due to the reduced sample size). Future studies may consider 
assessing young children’s guilt-proneness using a different method, or may choose to 
study correlates of guilt-proneness in samples with children who are older than age 6 or 7.  
The goal of this study was to understand variations in the nature and intensity of 
children’s distress when they told narratives about past experiences in which they hurt 
others. I explored how one factor—children’s guilt-proneness—related to these variations. 
Findings suggests that more guilt-prone youth feel more current, immersive forms of 
distress (but not past distress) than less guilt-prone youth when they narrate their 
harmdoing experiences. This distress is also more temporally stable over the course of 
narration, particularly when more guilt-prone youth narrate my-fault harm experiences. 
Since current feelings of distress may interfere with narrative processes whereby children 




about their experiences with attentive listeners who help coregulate children’s distress. 
Skilled listeners can help youth avoid patterns of maladaptive rumination, help them to 
reflect on their distress with some distance rather than in immersive ways, and provide 
support that leads to reductions in children’s distress. Such scaffolding may protect youth 
from feeling elevated distress when they are later reminded of these experiences, promote 
their prospective mental and physical health, and further children’s developing sense that 
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